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WHEN THE “MACHINE THAT GOES ‘PING’” CAUSES HARM: 
DEFAULT TORTS RULES AND TECHNOLOGICALLY-MEDIATED 
HEALTH CARE INJURIES* 
NICOLAS P. TERRY** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The publication of To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System1 
turned the reduction of medical error from a professional aspiration into a 
finite public and political issue.  Despite the existence of newer and even 
contradictory studies,2 for a generation of doctors, lawyers and policymakers 
medical error will irrevocably be associated with between 44,0003 and 98,0004 
error-related deaths per year.5  The reduction of those numbers has been 
established as an operational imperative. 
The health care industry is still absorbing the implications of the 
information technology and e-commerce-led revolution of the last decade.6  
Business-to-consumer (hereinafter referred to as “B2C”) health advice sites 
and business-to-business (hereinafter referred to as “B2B”) models, such as 
continuing education, procurement and telemedicine, all seem to have traction 
in the marketplace.  Penetration of technology into the health care delivery 
system is also being broadly driven by the electronic data interchange 
standards introduced by regulations made under the Health Insurance 
 
* © 2001 Nicolas P. Terry.  Based in part on a presentation delivered at the Saint Louis 
University Annual Law Journal Health Law Symposium, E-health: Structural, Legal and Ethical 
Implications, April 20, 2001. 
** Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University. 
 1. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN]. 
 2. See, e.g., Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to 
Medical Errors: Preventability Is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415 (2001). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See also Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Reducing and Preventing Adverse 
Drug Events to Decrease Hospital Costs (2001) (estimating that 770,000 injuries and deaths each 
year are caused by adverse drug events, many of which are the result of medication errors), 
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/aderia/aderia.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001). 
 6. See Nicolas P. Terry, Structural and Legal Implications of E-Health, 33 J. HEALTH L. 
605 (2000). 
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Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).7  These standards will 
encourage electronic billing, insurance reimbursement and prescription 
fulfillment systems and also will promote infrastructure-related peripheral 
systems such as longitudinal patient records and computer surveillance 
systems.8 
In general terms, however, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) was correct 
when it noted in the Crossing the Quality Chasm report that, “[h]ealth care 
delivery has been relatively untouched by the revolution in information 
technology that has been transforming nearly every other aspect of society.”9  
This will change rapidly because a massive infusion of technology is viewed as 
the key component in process-based reform of the health care delivery 
system.10  While process and technology-based attacks on medical error may 
not represent a total solution for the medical error problem,11 at a simple 
operational level this is where regulatory energies and investment dollars will 
be concentrated.  As the IOM has recommended: 
Congress, the executive branch, leaders of health care organizations, public 
and private purchasers, and health informatics associations and vendors should 
make a renewed national commitment to building an information infrastructure 
to support health care delivery, consumer health, quality measurement and 
improvement, public accountability, clinical and health services research, and 
clinical education.  This commitment should lead to the elimination of most 
handwritten clinical data by the end of the decade.12 
The growth of technologically-mediated care should directly reduce 
medical error.  It will also have positive indirect effects such as improving the 
data sets that underlie peer review, state disciplinary oversight and medical 
malpractice litigation.  A technologically-mediated health care delivery system 
also should deliver substantial reductions in information costs for consumers, 
improving choice as to both quality and safety.  What seems less clear is the 
extent to which process re-engineering and conversion to technology-centered 
error reduction systems will create a new set of quality of care externalities.  
The United States health care industry may have been laggard in adopting 
 
 7. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 8. See Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy Regulation on Medical 
Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 361 (2001). 
 9. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE 
QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 15 (2001) [hereinafter 
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM]. 
 10. See James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 768 
(2000). 
 11. See Lucian L. Leape, Foreword: Preventing Medical Accidents: Is “Systems Analysis” 
the Answer?, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 145 (2001). 
 12. CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 9, at 17. 
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information technologies, but it is no stranger to a broad range of other 
technologies and the failure rates that accompany them.13 
This Article explores some of the liability questions posed by increasing 
the technology component in health care delivery.  First, I take the position that 
the process and technology reforms triggered by To Err Is Human inevitably 
will confirm institutional liability as the default position for modern 
malpractice claims.  I argue that process reform and technology-based quality 
control finally will fulfill the promise of corporate liability first outlined nearly 
forty years ago in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital14 and 
supersede a liability structure that relies on a species of respondeat superior 
doctrine that owes more to creative writing than hornbook law. 
Second, I argue that the likely adverse event scenarios that will result from 
technologically-mediated diagnosis, treatment and care will severely test our 
current torts operational rules,15 particularly those that lie at the intersection of 
malpractice and products liability. 
II.  ERRORS, TECHNOLOGY AND AN INSTITUTIONAL DUTY DEFAULT 
Re-reading Darling today, the opinion seems overly ambitious in tackling 
both the issue of institutional liability16 and the use of accreditation standards 
and hospital bylaws as custom-surrogates.17  It also seems somewhat 
underdeveloped at the doctrinal level, supplying neither analytical depth nor 
 
 13. See, e.g., Kenneth Chan, When Implants Fail, Patients Suffer Twice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
7, 2001, at F1. 
 14. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).  Cf. E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical 
Practice and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939 (1999). 
 15. For a general discussion of allocation models and operational rules see Nicolas P. Terry, 
Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717 (1993). 
 16. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (citing Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)). 
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake 
to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act 
upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact.  Present-day hospitals, as their 
manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for 
treatment . . . .  The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations 
and the defendant’s bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and other responsible 
authorities regard it as both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume certain 
responsibilities for the care of the patient. 
Id. 
 17. Id. at 257. 
In the present case the regulations, standards, and bylaws which the plaintiff introduced 
into evidence, performed much the same function as did evidence of custom.  This 
evidence aided the jury in deciding what was feasible and what the defendant knew or 
should have known.  It did not conclusively determine the standard of care and the jury 
was not instructed that it did. 
Id. 
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operational detail.18  Notwithstanding this fact, institutional19 or corporate 
liability20 as exemplified by Darling21 has routinely been applied in cases 
involving facilities,22 equipment,23 staffing24 and the maintenance of 
premises.25  Some jurisdictions have been explicit in combining these strands 
into a comprehensive and cohesive declaration of institutional duty: 
The hospital’s duties have been classified into four general areas: (1) a duty to 
use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and 
equipment; (2) a duty to select and retain only competent physicians; (3) a duty 
to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care; 
and (4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to 
ensure quality care for the patients . . . . 
  . . . . 
  [W]e adopt as a theory of hospital liability the doctrine of corporate 
negligence or corporate liability under which the hospital is liable if it fails to 
uphold the proper standard of care owed its patient. In addition, we fully 
embrace the aforementioned four categories of the hospital’s duties.26 
In too many jurisdictions, however, the law has remained unsettled in cases 
involving diagnosis, treatment and care, which courts historically have viewed 
as the responsibility of individual care providers, rather than the institution.  
More specifically, questions have arisen as to whether institutions are directly 
 
 18. See, for example, the comments of the court in Gafner v. Down East Community 
Hospital, 735 A.2d 969, 978 (Me. 1999) (addressing institutional liability more generally). 
 19. Institutional liability not only includes hospitals, but also managed care organizations, 
including health maintenance organizations (HMOs).  See Jones v. Chi. HMO, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 
1128 (Ill. 2000). 
 20. Defined by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as follows: 
  Corporate negligence is a doctrine under which the hospital is liable if it fails to 
uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient, which is to ensure the patient’s safety 
and well-being while at the hospital. This theory of liability creates a nondelegable duty 
which the hospital owes directly to a patient. Therefore, an injured party does not have to 
rely on and establish the negligence of a third party. 
Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991) (footnote omitted). 
 21. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965). 
 22. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977); Chandler Gen. Hosp. Inc. v. 
Purvis, 181 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971). 
 23. Emory Univ. v. Porter, 120 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961). 
 24. See, e.g., Merritt v. Karcioglu, 668 So. 2d 469 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Johnson v. 
Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981); Wood v. Samaritan Inst., 161 P.2d 556 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1945). 
 25. Flowers v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 884 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1994) (involving a 
patient falling from a gurney). 
 26. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707-08 (Pa. 1991). 
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liable in informed consent cases27 and the extent to which the institutional duty 
is non-regressive, meaning whether it is limited to pre-adverse event 
credentialing or policymaking,28 or continues forward to apply to occasions of 
individual treatment.29  The indeterminacy surrounding the reach of Darling30 
has threatened to minimize its impact and characterize it as little more than an 
institutional version of administrative or ministerial liability.31 
Only a few courts have shown outright hostility towards the doctrine of 
institutional liability.32  Objections to the institutional default may, however, be 
 
 27. See, e.g., Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 472 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that absent agency 
relationship with physician, hospital had no duty to obtain patient’s informed consent to surgery).  
See also Wells v. Storey, No. 1970450, 1999 Ala. LEXIS 361 (Ala. Nov. 24, 1999); Bryant v. 
HCA Health Servs. of N. Tenn., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 804 (Tenn. 2000); Cooper v. Curry, 589 P.2d 
201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).  See also Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1997) (reviewing 
authorities); Cf. Clark v. Perry, 442 S.E.2d 57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Butler v. S. Fulton Med. 
Ctr., 452 S.E.2d 768, 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
  In obtaining a consent form, a nurse is not acting as a “borrowed servant” of the 
doctor, but as an employee of the hospital because the task of obtaining a properly 
executed form is administrative and does not involve professional medical skill or 
judgment . . . .  The verification that a consent form has been properly executed and is part 
of the patient’s records does not require application of medical judgment and the hospital 
may be liable under some circumstances for the nurses’ failure to obtain the form in 
violation of its internal procedure. 
Butler, 452 S.E.2d at 772. 
 28. For example, an institution may have a duty to use reasonable care in formulating the 
policies and procedures that govern its medical staff and nonphysician personnel.  See Denton 
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. LaCroix, 947 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App. 1997); Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 
S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
 29. This is particularly the case where the patient’s own relationship with the institution is 
tenuous.  See, e.g., Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 172 (Wash. 1994) (holding that corporate 
liability should not be imputed to a hospital that granted hospital privileges to a non-employee 
physician who allegedly harmed a patient in his private office off the hospital premises).  See also 
Tripp v. Pate, 271 S.E.2d 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). 
 30. See generally David H. Rutchik, The Emerging Trend of Corporate Liability: Courts’ 
Uneven Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 535 (1994). 
 31. See, e.g., Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1023 (Ill. 1996). 
 32. See, for example, Gafner v. Down East Community Hospital, 735 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Me. 
1999), where the allegation of institutional negligence was the hospital’s failure to have in place a 
written policy requiring mandatory consultation with a specialist in the case of high risk births. 
The court stated: 
There are a number of reasons for our refusal to accept the [plaintiffs’] theory of liability 
against the Hospital.  Private hospitals in Maine are extensively regulated.  The 
Legislature has created duties and guidelines for the actions of those hospitals in a number 
of areas.  Before the expansion of tort liability into an area that has been significantly 
controlled by the Legislature, we should allow the Legislature to address the policy 
considerations and determine whether imposing such a duty constitutes wise public 
policy. 
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more deep-rooted and viewed as an endorsement of the deconstruction of 
individual professionalism, that itself may be an anathema to many judges.  At 
a more superficial level, the very label, “institutional liability,” may be 
problematic, suggesting to some judges a blanket rule re-allocating adverse 
event losses to hospitals.  It is far more accurate to state the contended-for rule 
as one of institutional duty.  Recognition of such a duty is but one element in a 
liability analysis.  Indeed, “for a hospital to be charged with negligence, it is 
necessary to show that the hospital had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
defect or procedures which created the harm.  Furthermore, the hospital’s 
negligence must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to 
the injured party.”33  Additionally, most allegations of diagnosis, treatment and 
care deficiencies will depend on expert testimony as to the national, customary 
standard of care of institutions.34 
Conventional arguments in favor of adopting the default position of 
institutional duty need not be related in detail.  These include improved 
deterrence because of the realities of modern credentialing and bylaws, more 
efficient compensation systems because of the market power of large 
institutions in planning and buying indemnity, and reduced system costs as 
plaintiffs are able to avoid the costs and uncertainties associated with 
individual liability models.35  I take the position that these arguments are 
 
  Moreover, creating a duty on the part of hospitals to control the actions of those 
physicians who have traditionally been considered independent contractors may shift the 
nature of the medical care provided by those physicians.  In an area as replete with the 
possibility of unexpected or unintended consequences as this, we should exercise restraint 
in the use of our authority to create new causes of action . . . . 
  In sum, there exist serious and unanswered public policy questions regarding the 
wisdom of requiring hospitals to control the medical judgments and actions of 
independent physicians practicing within their facilities.  Those questions implicate both 
quality of care and economic considerations.  We will not lightly adopt a new theory of 
liability in an area of such significant concern for the public health.  We decline to do so 
here. 
Id. at 979-80. 
 33. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 708 (Pa. 1991). 
 34. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177 (D.C.  1990) (holding that the 
alleged failure of the hospital to provide anesthesiologists with an end-tidal carbon dioxide 
monitor was sufficient to create an issue of fact for jury). 
 35. Underlying the tort of institutional negligence is a recognition of the comprehensive 
nature of hospital operations today.  The hospital’s expanded role in providing health care 
services to patients brings with it increased corporate responsibilities.  As Darling explained: 
Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than 
furnish facilities for treatment.  They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of 
physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual workers, and they 
charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, 
by legal action. 
Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257. 
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strongly reinforced by the phenomena of process reform and the emergence of 
technologically-mediated health care.  Further, I argue that key technological 
and structural shifts facing our health care delivery system, adapted to reduce 
medical error, will confirm the final maturation of an institutional duty default.  
These phenomena I identify as institutional marketing, regulating 
technologically-mediated care, accrediting technology and the structural and 
organizational realities associated with technologically-mediated health care. 
A.  Institutional Marketing 
In the absence of corporate or enterprise duty emerging as the default 
liability rule for quality of care or “technical care” litigation,36 courts have 
continued to refine intellectually bankrupt vicarious liability rules to 
approximate institutional liability.  These theories include case-by-case agency 
based on the right to control rather than actual control,37 agency by estoppel,38 
and non-delegable duty.39  It is, however, theories based on ostensible agency40 
or apparent agency41 that have flourished in a health care industry environment 
re-organizing around consolidated entities, integrated delivery, institutional 
realities and holistic marketing.  Furthermore, these are features that are both 
confirmed and reinforced by technological advancement, as hospitals both tout 
their process technologies and embrace new technological channels such as the 
web to market and provide their comprehensive services. 
Of the agency theories that apply institutional duty to (arguably) individual 
errors, the current favorite is ostensible or apparent agency.  More specifically, 
several courts are showing a preference for the version in the RESTATEMENT 
 
  Expounding on the point, this court later stated: “[A] modern hospital . . . is an amalgam 
of many individuals not all of whom are licensed medical practitioners.  Moreover, it is clear that 
at times a hospital functions far beyond the narrow sphere of medical practice.”  Greenberg v. 
Michael Reese Hosp., 415 N.E.2d 390, 395 (Ill. 1980).  “Thus, in recognizing hospital 
institutional negligence as a cause of action, Darling merely applied principles of common law 
negligence to hospitals in a manner that comports with the true scope of their operations.”  Jones 
v. Chi. HMO, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1127 (Ill. 2000).  See generally Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. 
Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 381 (1994); Arthur F. Southwick, Hospital Liability—Two Theories Have Been 
Merged, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 49 (1983). Cf. Rutchik, supra note 30, at 548-50. 
 36. A distinction was advanced between interpersonal care and technical care.  1 AVEDIS 
DONABEDIAN, EXPLORATIONS IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING: THE DEFINITION OF 
QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS ASSESSMENT 4-6 (1980). 
 37. See Berel v. HCA Health Serv. of Tex., Inc., 881 S.W.2d 21, 21 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 38. See Sword v. NKC Hosp., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
 39. See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 
P.2d 1153 (Ariz. 1972). 
 40. See Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hosp., 910 P.2d 271 (Nev. 1996). 
 41. See Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1376. 
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OF TORTS42 over that to be found in the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY.43  The 
former approach to apparent agency is preferred by malpractice plaintiffs 
because it lacks the more rigorous justifiable reliance provision found in the 
latter.44  Building on this more generous representational standard, courts have 
pioneered a rule that essentially places the onus on the hospital or HMO to 
refute a patient’s belief that the treating physician is an employee of the 
institution.45  As framed by an Oregon court: 
 (1) the hospital must hold itself out as a provider of medical services, and (2) 
unless the patient has actual knowledge of the physician’s actual status as an 
independent contractor, the patient can recover if it is objectively reasonable 
for the patient to believe that physician is an employee of the hospital.46 
As a result robust examples of de facto institutional duty are to be found in 
cases where health care organizational reality and institutional marketing 
combine, leaving the hospital with little room to refute the patient’s reasonable 
expectations of a health care provider’s employment status.  For instance, in 
Kashishian v. Port, involving the allegedly negligent acts of an independent 
contractor cardiologist, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed that 
“[m]odern hospitals have spent billions of dollars marketing themselves, 
nurturing the image with the consuming public that they are full-care modern 
health facilities.”47 
B.  Regulating Technologically-mediated Care 
Measured against the modest goal of providing compensation for fault-
caused adverse events, the law of medical malpractice operates at a reasonable 
level of efficiency.  Arguably, it provides a needed role for patients or their 
representatives in assuring a forum for public accountability for substandard 
care.  The malpractice system aimed at an individual care provider, however, is 
an incredibly clumsy tool for deterring medical error.  Little better are our state 
 
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965). 
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). 
 44. See Jennison v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 358 (Or. 2001). 
 45. See, e.g., Sword v. NKC Hosps. Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999); Butler v. Domin, 15 
P.3d 1189, 1198 (Mont. 2000) (finding § 429 decisions “particularly relevant”); Jennison, 25 P.3d 
at 366. 
 46. Jennison, 25 P.3d at 358.  See also, the following statement by the court in Butler: 
Butler’s testimony that he did not receive notice of the employment relationship between 
Dr. Ehrlich and St. Patrick Hospital is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether St. Patrick Hospital intentionally or negligently caused Butler to believe that 
Dr. Ehrlich was its agent.  Furthermore, it is not apparent from the record that Butler had 
any knowledge which would indicate that he did not in fact believe that Dr. Ehrlich was 
St. Patrick Hospital’s employee. 
Butler, 15 P.3d at 1198. 
 47. Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1992).  See also Simmons v. Tuomey 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312 (S.C. 2000). 
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licensure-based disciplinary systems that, while arguably effective in egregious 
cases such as fraud, substance abuse and multiple instances of error, lack the 
resources to tackle closer cases or the legal competence to address systemic 
failures.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the decades since Darling have witnessed 
a steady increase in regulatory activity that looks to improve quality by being 
compliance-based and institution-oriented. 
For example, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 requires 
(assumedly institutional) peer review entities that take adverse actions to report 
the same to state licensure boards.48  It is the institution that subsequently 
enjoys a correlated immunity from damages.49 Health care institutions that 
desire drug and device research funding must appoint Institutional Research 
Boards (IRBs).  It is the IRB that then must determine that “[i]nformed consent 
will be sought from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative . . . .”50 Indeed, even courts that have been less than enthusiastic 
about imposing institutional liability in diagnosis, care and treatment cases 
have done so where the institution has assumed the consent duty in this context 
of regulated clinical investigation.51 
These trends, demonstrating the assumption of an institutional role 
followed by its regulation, will be solidified by the most rigorous regulation of 
technologically-mediated health care that we have yet seen: the HIPAA 
privacy regulations (PIHI).52  The PIHI regulations apply to health care entities 
that utilize Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) for their transactions.  The 
likelihood of any health care institution not doing so is minimal.  PIHI requires 
consented-to disclosure53 for treatment, payment or health care operations 
purposes and authorized disclosures for other purposes.54  Theoretically, these 
consents and authorizations could be kept separate from the informed consents 
required for treatment; in practice it seems unlikely that they will be.  As a 
result, these institutional duties will occupy the same operational space as 
 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (1995). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (1995). 
If a professional review action . . . of a professional review body meets all the standards 
specified in section 11112(a) of this title . . . the professional review body . . . shall not be 
liable in damages under any law of the United States or of any State (or political 
subdivision thereof) with respect to the action. 
Id. 
 50. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(4) (2000). 
 51. See, e.g., Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Kus v. Sherman 
Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 652 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. 1995). 
 52. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 and 164). 
 53. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,810-11. 
 54. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
82,811. 
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treatment-related informed consent, vaporizing any institutional arguments that 
the latter remain individual duties. 
C.  Accrediting Technology 
Darling established a link between institutional duty and accreditation 
standards by suggesting that the latter operates as a surrogate for traditional 
expert testimony as to the standard of care.55  The 2001 revisions56 to the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) standards 
mandate increased proactive reporting and risk reduction systems in order to 
reduce medical error.57  Specifically, there are new requirements promoting 
database driven risk management and error reduction systems58 and mandating 
improvements in institutional knowledge-base systems.59  It is beyond a doubt 
that accreditation agencies view technologically-mediated care as an 
institutional responsibility, making it more likely than ever that a court 
examining a malpractice claim resulting from a technology induced error 
would hold the institution accountable by default.60 
D.  Infrastructure and Organizational Realities 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently ruled that “[o]ur medical-legal 
jurisprudence is based on images of health care that no longer exist.”61  Of 
course, Darling62 and the more faithful of its followers63 have long urged that 
the business realities of health care delivery are the most potent arguments in 
favor of institutional duty.  Such arguments are premised on the shift in the 
center of gravity of health care from individuals to institutions from the 
perspective of both the business relationships and the expectations of 
consumers.  The new reality of technologically-mediated health care is that it 
can only exist at the institutional level. 
 
 55. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257. 
 56. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Revisions to Joint 
Commission Standards in Support of Patient Safety and Medical/Health Care Error Reduction 
(July 1, 2001), available at http://www.jcaho.org/standard/fr_ptsafety.html (last visited Sept. 29, 
2001). 
 57. Id.  See Standard LD.5.2 of the Leadership Chapter for a discussion of this standard. 
 58. Id.  See Standard IM.8 of the Management of Information Chapter for a discussion of 
these new requirements. 
 59. Id.  See Standard IM.9 of the Management of Information Chapter regarding knowledge-
based information systems, resources and services. 
 60. See generally id. 
 61. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1246 (N.J. 1999).  Perez was concerned with 
the continued validity of the learned intermediary rule in an environment dominated by direct-to-
consumer advertising of prescription drugs.  Id. at 1254-55, 1263.  See also infra note 102 and 
accompanying text. 
 62. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 63. See supra note 35. 
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Technologically-mediated medicine will comprise a vast array of services 
that will range from information systems and knowledge bases to physician 
order entry (POE) systems.64  For example, Automated Medication Dispensing 
Devices will eliminate indecipherable or confusing handwritten orders, flag 
drug interactions, and positively identify the patient and drug prior to 
administration.65  Other expert systems that check patient diagnoses and 
treatment regimes against clinical practice guidelines will also enter the 
market.66  As the IOM has recognized, “these ‘smart’ systems are expected to 
lead to a redefinition of the physician’s role, as they begin to perform functions 
that formerly only a physician could perform.”67 
Indeed, institutions, and institutions alone, will design, build, control and 
operate this new health information infrastructure upon which the new 
applications and processes will be built.  The legal rules must reflect this 
changing reality.  Consider, for example, just one court’s rationale that is given 
for denying an institutional duty to obtain informed consent: “[T]he hospital 
does not know the patient’s medical history, nor the details of the particular 
surgery to be performed.”68  Such a statement is facially and irretrievably at 
odds with the new technologically-mediated health systems. 
III.  TECHNOLOGICAL CARE AND OPERATIONAL LIABILITY RULES 
In 1991, the IOM recognized that “the interaction of . . . ‘smart’ systems 
with computer-based patient records will . . . raise a host of legal and policy 
issues . . . .”69 Specifically, the IOM report queried the “allocation of 
responsibility (and liability) for errors in the artificial intelligence system, 
whether caused by faulty hardware, faulty software or error in the system’s 
 
 64. See, e.g., Michael D. Murray, Automated Medication Dispensing Devices, in MAKING 
HEALTH CARE SAFER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICE 111-17 (Shojania et 
al. eds., 2001) (prepared by the University of California at San Francisco – Stanford University 
Evidence-based Practice Center under Contract No. 290-97-0013 for the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality), at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/pdf/ptsafety.pdf [hereinafter 
MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER]. 
 65. For example, MEDSTATION System 2000/Rx System 2000 “[a]llows controlled access 
to 95% of all medications, [d]isplays only pharmacy approved orders for a selected patient [and] 
[i]nterfaces to automated med charting system.”  See http://www.pyxis.com/products/medstation 
2000.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2001) for additional information. 
 66. See generally COMM. ON IMPROVING THE PATIENT RECORD, DIV. OF HEALTH CARE 
SERVS., INST. OF MED., THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD: AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY 
FOR HEALTH CARE (Richard S. Dick et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT 
RECORD]. 
 67. Id. at 179.  For a discussion about the impact of technology on the physician-patient 
relationship, see Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Technology and Informed Consent: 
Computers and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 1019 (1998). 
 68. Krane v. Saint Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 69. COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD, supra note 66, at 179. 
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medical rules.”70  Providers’ most immediate legal vulnerabilities, discussed 
first below, will be faced in the transition from traditional services to more 
technologically-enabled care.  Hospitals which have re-engineered their 
facilities and built technologically sophisticated infrastructures on which to run 
longitudinal patient records and POE systems could experience system-wide 
failures related either to component failures or widespread system design 
issues.  Similarly, individual devices, such as B2B handheld computers used 
by physicians to access records or B2B monitoring appliances used in patients’ 
homes,71 are likely to involve some level of patient risk that the torts, 
malpractice and products liability systems must process. 
A.  Failure to Upgrade Technology 
While there seems to be abstract agreement as to the need for process 
reform and increased use of technology, institutions will face considerable 
difficulties in setting their priorities for the reforms that lie ahead.  For 
example, a recent University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) report 
prepared for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) used 
evidence-based medicine practices to rate patient safety practices that had 
shown potential for reducing adverse events.72  The eleven most highly rated of 
the seventy-nine potential patient safety practices generally impacted clinical 
rather than organizational matters.73  This suggests that the hypothetical 
“reasonable” hospital may still face more traditional challenges before it can 
allocate resources to system re-engineering. 
Clearly a health care institution is under a duty to provide its patients with 
appropriate and usable medical equipment.74  Proving negligent breach of that 
duty, however, can be quite complex.  Some courts subscribe to the view that 
“the standard of nonmedical, administrative, ministerial, or routine care at a 
hospital need not be established by expert testimony because the jury is 
competent from its own experience to determine and apply such a reasonable-
care standard.”75  This, however, represents confusion between ministerial or 
administrative care and common knowledge, and between “the manner of 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., Panasonic, Welcome to Panasonic’s Telecare Solutions, at 
http://www.panasonic.com/telecare/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2001); HomMed, How it Works, The 
HomMed Monitor and the HomMed Central Station, at http://www.hommed.com/patients_ 
families/how_it_works_print.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2001); Vitaphone, at http://login.vitaphone. 
de/e/new_content_start.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2001). 
 72. See generally MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER, supra note 64. 
 73. Id. at 16. 
 74. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1977).  See also Suttle v. Lake 
Forest Hosp., 733 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (discussing hospital’s failure to have 
equipment on hand for measuring the blood pressure of newborns). 
 75. St. Paul Med. Ctr. v. Cecil, 842 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. App. 1992). 
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proof by which negligence can or must be established and the character of the 
negligence itself . . . .”76  An adverse event may be caused by ordinary 
negligence (for instance, a defect in premises), administrative negligence (for 
instance, a hiring error or system failure), ministerial negligence (for instance, 
a nonphysician care provider’s mistake) or professional negligence (a medical 
error by an individual physician or an institution).  In each case, the question of 
whether expert testimony is required will depend on factors such as the 
intricacies of the equipment and procedure or the complexity of the particular 
adverse event.77  It is more likely that common knowledge will substitute for 
expert testimony in a “simple” fact pattern, such as a facilities error.78  
Thereafter, a court that requires expert testimony will have to decide what type 
of expert would be required.  Thus, an allegation of negligent maintenance of 
equipment seldom will require professional expert testimony,79 unlike cases 
involving how the equipment was used on the patient.80 
 
 76. Flowers v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 884 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1994). 
 77. See, e.g., Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1233 (La. 1994) (“Expert testimony is not 
required where the physician does an obviously careless act, such as fracturing a leg during 
examination, amputating the wrong arm, dropping a knife, scalpel, or acid on a patient, or leaving 
a sponge in a patient’s body, from which a lay person can infer negligence.”).  See also 
Rehabilitative Care Systems of America v. Davis, in which the court stated: 
[T]he sole claim in the present case is that RCSA negligently supervised Davis in carrying 
out his exercise program by failing to be present or at least nearby to prevent his being 
injured if the Total Gym malfunctioned . . . the standard of care in this type of situation is 
not beyond the understanding of an average juror, i.e., something that would require 
expert testimony. 
43 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. App. 2001). 
 78. See generally In re Waters v. Jarman, 547 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing 
applicability of procedural rule regarding expert testimony).  In Waters, the court stated “[o]ur 
courts have applied the medical malpractice statutory standard of care and required expert 
testimony where the corporate negligence claims arose out of clinical care provided by the 
hospital to the patient.”  Id. at 144-45.  The Waters court further stated: 
  However, where the corporate negligence claims allege negligence on the part of the 
hospital for administrative or management deficiencies, the courts have instead applied 
the reasonably prudent person standard of care . . . .  Collectively, we believe these cases 
stand for the proposition that corporate negligence actions brought against a hospital 
which pertain to clinical patient care constitute medical malpractice actions; however, 
where the corporate negligence claim arises out of policy, management or administrative 
decisions, such as granting or continuing hospital privileges, failing to monitor or oversee 
performance of the physicians, credentialing, and failing to follow hospital policies, the 
claim is instead derived from ordinary negligence principles.  This distinction is 
consistent with the statutory definition of medical malpractice actions, which requires that 
the claim arise of out services “in the performance of medical, dental or other health 
care.” 
Id. at 145. 
 79. See, e.g., Broadway v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 638 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 80. See, e.g., Dean v. Ochsner Med. Found. Hosp. & Clinic, 749 So. 2d 36, 39 (La. Ct. App. 
1999). 
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The recent case of Smith v. United States81 illustrates issues that may arise 
during the transitional period.  Smith dealt with a six-month delay between 
performing a mammogram and notifying the patient and her physician of a 
discovered abnormality.82  Traditionally, the defendant’s hospital had used a 
form-based system for requesting a radiological test and transmitting results to 
the originating physician.83  In addition, it was the hospital’s policy that 
abnormal results were reported to the originating physician by phone.84  The 
mammogram in question had been performed while the hospital was 
transitioning to a computer-based system under which the test results would be 
entered into the computer system such that the originating physician would be 
notified when he next logged on.85  A coding of “abnormal” also would result 
in a specific e-mail notification being automatically generated and sent to the 
originating physician.86  In addition, during the transitional phase, a hard copy 
of the results would be printed at the originating physician’s clinic.87  In the 
case at hand, the originating physician had not been trained on the computer 
system, and there was no record of a phone call being made to him or a copy of 
the abnormal test result being printed at the clinic where he worked.88  Trying 
the case without a jury, the district court judge held that “the hospital had a 
duty to implement a reasonable procedure during the transition phase to 
computers which would timely deliver radiology test results to requesting 
physicians, and that it did not breach that duty.”89 
Smith is not a clean case.  The court believed that the physicians were the 
responsible parties and so viewed this as an occasion of individual professional 
malpractice more than institutional negligence.90  Furthermore, evaluation of 
its holding is clouded by issues such as the Federal Tort Claims Act’s91 impact 
on the alleged negligence of the independent computer contractors; the court’s 
somewhat confused approach to the standard of care (whether ministerial or 
professional); whether and what expert evidence was required and the 
unsatisfactory nature of much of the expert testimony. 
Nevertheless, the case does point to the future of litigation over such 
issues.  First, fulfilling some unspoken contrarian destiny, complex systems 
 
 81. 119 F. Supp. 2d 561 (D. S.C. 2000). 
 82. Smith, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
 83. Id. at 575. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 566-67. 
 86. Id. at 567. 
 87. Smith, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 568. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 575. 
 90. Discussing the testimony of the originating physician and the radiologist, the court 
commented “[both] had a motive to blame the hospital procedures for the error that occurred to 
distract from their own likely negligent acts.”  Id. at 576. 
 91. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994). 
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designed to reduce medical mistakes will themselves be error prone.  Second, 
particularly thorny problems are likely to arise during the transition from paper 
to electronic records and procedures.  Third, we likely will see considerable 
litigation regarding the designs of health care technology systems, with 
particular emphasis placed on user interfaces; the incorporation of multiple 
systems; error-checking and other sub-systems designed to either reduce 
human error or flag possible system errors.  Fourth, the nature of expert 
testimony will change in what would have been considered ministerial or even 
professional cases where we would have required either administrator or 
physician expert testimony.  In contrast, we will now see an increased use of 
information technology (IT) and Health Information Management (HIM) 
experts.  Fifth (taking Smith at face value), it is likely that in the early stages of 
IT deployment in health care environments, the standard of care based on 
health care technology custom is going to be quite low.  Defendants, however, 
should take little comfort from this as their peer institutions demonstrate an 
increasingly voracious appetite for technology and rapidly upgrade their 
infrastructure and service. 
B.  System and Appliance Failures 
Once complex new systems are in place, some adverse events inevitably 
will be traced to system-wide failures or defects in the software or hardware 
applicable to discrete components within the hospital (for instance, a POE 
cart).  Individual appliance failure may also occur in a Web-enabled 
monitoring appliance installed in a patient’s home.  These technologies will 
prove highly troubling to currently established torts liability categories.  
Specifically, an attempt to process such an adverse event using a products 
liability categorization will mobilize the resistance historically shown by courts 
to applying strict liability in fact-patterns involving health care providers.92  
Equally, even if the courts adopt a negligence allocation model, the 
substitution of these new appliances for ministerial, and in some cases even 
professional human interactions, will raise questions about the types of expert 
testimony that may be required. 
Before addressing the heath care delivery nature of these implicated 
products, a more fundamental issue might be raised (though relatively swiftly 
dismissed) as to whether products liability type theories could be available 
 
 92. This issue is antecedent to questions that likely will arise in such litigation over the 
admissibility of FDA approval or even the preemption of common law claims.  See, e.g., Weiland 
v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1149 (Ill. 1999).  Cf. Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 967 
S.W.2d 360 (Tex. 1998).  It also involves litigation, more generally with the effect of FDA 
approval of the device.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 
2000).  See generally Arnold J. Rosoff, On Being a Physician in the Electronic Age: Peering into 
the Mists at Point-&-Click Medicine, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111 (2002) (discussing FDA regulation 
of e-health devices). 
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against an upstream defendant such as a system supplier or an appliance seller.  
This argument suggests that products liability is not applicable because the 
injury is not so much caused by the physical product itself as by its output, its 
intangible diagnosis or data.  This type of argument has surfaced elsewhere in 
e-health,93 suggesting obstacles to constructing actions against health advice 
Web sites.94  Courts confronted with similar issues have refused to immunize 
the manufacturers of aeronautical charts95 and arguably pulled computer 
software into the liability net.96  The few reported cases directly on point97 
suggest that computerized systems that cause injury will fall within the ambit 
of products liability98 and may even benefit from a wellspring of judicial 
skepticism about the integrity of complex computer-based systems.99 
More specifically, adverse health care events have had a complex and 
generally unsatisfactory relationship with strict liability.  It is not without a 
sense of irony that an important clue as to how our courts have wished to 
process such cases may be gleaned from one of the most complex (and now 
suspect) intersections, the learned intermediary doctrine.  A sub-rule of strict 
products liability that is applied in warning cases brought against prescription 
drug and medical device manufacturers, the learned intermediary deems the 
prescribing physician to be the “consumer” of the injury-producing drug or 
 
 93. See Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine, 25 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 327, 351-58 (1999). 
 94. See, e.g., Birmingham v. Fodor’s Travel Publ’ns. Inc., 833 P.2d 70, 77 (Haw. 1992) 
(holding that publisher of travel book did not have a duty to warn tourist of dangerous condition 
of beach). 
 95. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1296 (9th  Cir. 1985); Saloomey 
v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 68, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 96. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, which stated: 
  [A]eronautical charts are highly technical tools.  They are graphic depictions of 
technical, mechanical data.  The best analogy to an aeronautical chart is a compass.  Both 
may be used to guide an individual who is engaged in an activity requiring certain 
knowledge of natural features.  Computer software that fails to yield the result for which it 
was designed may be another . . . .  The chart itself is like a physical “product” while the 
“How to Use” book is pure thought and expression. 
938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (footnote omitted). 
 97. In contrast to the voluminous case law dealing with low quality software and hardware 
that causes pure economic loss.  See, e.g., Black, Jackson & Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. Int’l 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 440 N.E.2d 282, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Prent Corp. v. Martek Holdings, 
Inc., 618 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). 
 98. See, e.g., Sparacino v. Andover Controls Corp., 592 N.E.2d 431, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(holding that a manufacturer of a programmable energy management system was not liable but 
only because this particular risk was not foreseeable). 
 99. See, e.g., Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1998) (“We find 
particularly troubling Volvo’s counterintuitive assumption that an electrical component cannot 
malfunction and that its unfailing performance can be predicted with absolute certainty in any and 
all circumstances.”). 
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device.  As a result, the manufacturer owes a duty to warn of risks associated 
with the drug or device to the treating physician and not the end-user patient.100 
The effect of the learned intermediary doctrine is that the patient is limited 
to a failure to warn, or failure to obtain informed consent, action against the 
physician.  The allocational effects are more far-reaching.  First (and 
obviously), the courts are shifting product-related risks from manufacturers to 
health care providers.  Second, the courts are allowing more of those product-
related risks to be externalized to consumer-patients by processing them 
through a negligence-based rather than strict liability system.101 
Today, it is arguable that the learned intermediary doctrine is in something 
of a retreat,102 and may even have been fatally undercut,103 by the growth of 
direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising.104  However, the courts still 
seem to subscribe to the second of the allocational positions described above—
that those who provide health care services may externalize more risks to 
patients than those who supply products to them.  This approach resonates in 
the varied intersections between strict liability (and hence products liability 
levels of risk re-allocation) and health care services that we have observed in 
modern tort law.  It is an approach that the realities of technologically-
mediated health care will severely test and may finally force us to reject. 
C.  Strict Liability for Adverse Events 
The first intersection of note is the suggestion that strict liability be 
imposed in cases of adverse error.  The Washington case of Helling v. Carey105 
is justly famous for attempting to correct an error made fifty years earlier when 
The T.J. Hooper106 failed to include professional malpractice in its retreat from 
exculpatory custom.107  Helling, however, also contained a concurrence that 
 
 100. See, e.g., Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ohio 1991). 
 101. An additional variable is the informed consent standard used in a particular jurisdiction.  
See generally Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).  Thus, a 
professional custom jurisdiction will externalize more risks to consumers than a jurisdiction 
applying a patient expectation standard of care. 
 102. See, e.g., Friedl v. Airsource, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding 
that the doctrine was not applicable in case of failure to provide adequate instructions for use).  
But cf., Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001) (refusing to fashion exception to 
learned intermediary doctrine where manufacturer distributed promotional free samples). 
 103. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1264 (N.J. 1999). 
 104. See Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,314 (May 14, 1996); Draft 
Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 
43,171 (Aug. 12, 1997); Guidance for Industry on Consumer-Directed Advertisements; 
Availability, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,197 (May 9, 1999). 
 105. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). 
 106. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 107. The Helling court stated: 
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argued “[i]f the standard of a reasonably prudent specialist is, in fact, 
inadequate to offer reasonable protection to the plaintiff, then liability can be 
imposed without fault.”108  In spite of Helling’s presence in most torts109 and 
health law110 texts, this approach has failed to engender any judicial interest, 
although it has been the subject of limited statutory experiments.111 
A year prior to Helling, a federal district court in Wisconsin suggested that 
strict liability could apply to health care delivery that was ministerial in nature 
rather than professional.112  With words that resonate strongly today in the 
context of institution-delivered technology services, the court argued: 
[T]he mechanical and administrative services provided by hospitals should 
necessarily be exempt from strict liability.  Several considerations lead me to 
this conclusion.  They are: first, the serious consequences which can result 
when a patient receives defective hospital services; second, the near total 
inability of laymen to recognize or control such defective service; and, finally, 
since doctors already are hampered by an inexact science, it is essential that 
they receive all pertinent information accurately to determine if a particular 
course of treatment is appropriate.  In short, it is in the public interest that 
those services which hospitals perform for both doctors and patients be 
performed properly.113 
Other courts, however, have ignored this siren call to apply strict liability 
for ministerial adverse events.114  One criticism voiced about such liability is 
the difficulty in distinguishing between ministerial and professional care.115  A 
similar argument may be made about the goods-services dichotomy discussed 
in detail below.116  In such cases courts seem concerned with the system or 
administrative costs of parsing the contended for rule.  One “solution” is to 
impose such costs on defendants.  As a particularly lonely voice for this 
 
  Under the facts of this case reasonable prudence required the timely giving of the 
pressure test to this plaintiff. The precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of 
glaucoma to patients under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of its 
disregard by the standards of the ophthalmology profession, it is the duty of the courts to 
say what is required to protect patients under 40 from the damaging results of glaucoma. 
Helling, 519 P.2d at 983. 
 108. Id. at 985 (Utter, J., concurring).  See also Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 539 (Cal. 
1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 109. See, e.g., JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 192 (2d 
ed. 1997). 
 110. See, e.g., BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 196 (4th ed. 2001). 
 111. See, e.g., The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE 
ANN. § 38.2-5009 (1950). 
 112. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (D. Wis. 1973). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); 
Femrite v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., 568 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 115. See, e.g., Hector, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 601. 
 116. See infra notes 123-125. 
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position argued in a case involving a hypodermic needle that broke in 
plaintiff’s gum: 
The injured patient should have the option of suing the dentist directly.  It is 
the dentist with whom plaintiff has dealt and in whose hands and confidence 
the patient has put herself.  It may be more difficult to sue a manufacturer or 
supplier located in a distant state or a foreign country.  The dentist chose the 
instrument.  The dentist is in a better position to know and prove the identity of 
the manufacturer or distributor.  If he cannot, the patient should not be denied 
recovery on that account.  The dentist should also know the quality of the 
instrument and the reliability of his source of supply.  This rule may encourage 
greater caution in purchasing equipment and examining for defects.117 
This type of malpractice-strict liability intersection case essentially seeks 
to apply strict liability to product-related adverse events.  This was essentially 
the position of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Anderson v. Somberg,118 
where the plaintiff alleged negligence against health care providers and strict 
product liability against suppliers of an angulated pituitary rongeur.  The court 
took the view that in such a mixed fact-pattern the burden was on the 
defendants to disprove culpability and “since at least one of the defendants 
could not sustain his burden of proof, at least one would be liable.”119  While 
somewhat flawed because of the court’s misunderstanding of the concept of 
product “defectiveness,”120 Anderson nevertheless points to one method of 
dealing with system or administrative costs–shifting them to the defendants. 
D.  Strict Liability for Supply of a Product Involved in Adverse Events 
The most successful strict liability argument made by patients who 
suffered adverse events has been that of strict products liability.121  Even these 
claims have been limited in their success.  In contrast to the strict liability 
arguments discussed above, these are not allegations that the health care 
provider should be strictly liable on a theory analogous to products liability.  
Rather, the provider is characterized as the supplier of the defective product; 
 
 117. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637, 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff’d, 250 A.2d 
129 (N.J. 1969) (Botter, J., dissenting); cf. Tanuz v. Carlberg, 921 P.2d 309, 310 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 118. 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975). 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. The courted treated the claim more like one brought in absolute liability.  See Nicolas P. 
Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717, 724 n.41 (1993). 
 121. See, e.g., Eby v. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 21 Pa. D. & C.4th 281 (C.P. Dauphin Co. 
1993) (allowing strict liability claim for injection of “inherently unsafe” solution); Bell v. Poplar 
Bluff Physicians Group, 879 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (interpreting malpractice statute of 
limitations); Providence Hosp. v. Truly, 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (finding hospital 
liable for breach of warranty for “contaminated drug”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
56 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:37 
meaning, the claim is a straightforward products liability action. As framed by 
a Pennsylvania court: 
In adopting the strict liability as set forth we are making a reasonable 
extrapolation from the already expanding interpretation of 402A, and clear 
policy considerations.  The surgical patient is without control over the 
procedures and instruments used upon him.  His health and future safety are at 
the mercy and skill of the treating physicians and the instruments he employs.  
It is elementary that if a hospital supplies equipment to an operating physician 
the hospital must appraise themselves of the risks involved and adopt every 
effort to insure the safety of the equipment chosen.  Furthermore, there was 
testimony in this case to indicate that the defect could have been discovered by 
a preliminary test on animal bone.  To require this minimal technique is not 
unreasonable and may very well have avoided the injuries to the plaintiff.122 
The overwhelming majority of courts have been skeptical of imposing 
strict liability on health care institutions.  Several defense arguments have had 
traction with courts.123  First, much is made of a declared service-product 
dichotomy. As one court explained it: 
Physicians, like hospitals, are providers of medical services.  The physician’s 
expertise lies in the diagnosis, treatment and cure of illness, not in the research 
or development of prosthetics or devices used to aid medical diagnosis or 
treatment.  A physician is not in the business of selling products, but rather is 
in the profession of providing medical services.  Products such as the 
prosthetic device in this case are supplied and utilized only as needed to 
deliver the professional medical service.  They are incidental, or integral, to a 
physician’s service, but they are not the focus of the physician’s delivery of 
health care.124 
 
 122. Grubb v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 387 A.2d 480, 490 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). 
 123. Frequently these defenses are successfully combined.  See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 256 
N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977). 
There are differences between the rendition of medical services and transactions in goods 
(or perhaps other types of services as well).  Medical and many other professional 
services tend often to be experimental in nature, dependent on factors beyond the control 
of the professional, and devoid of certainty or assurance of results.  Medical services are 
an absolute necessity to society, and they must be readily available to the people.  It is 
said that strict liability will inevitably increase the cost for medical services, which might 
make them beyond the means of many consumers, and that imposition of strict liability 
might hamper progress in developing new medicines and medical techniques. 
Id. at 391 (footnotes omitted). 
 124. Cafazzo v. Central Med. Health Servs., Inc., 635 A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); 
see also In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab., 503 S.E.2d 445, 448-51 (S.C. 1998); Royer v. Catholic 
Med. Ctr., 741 A.2d 74 (N.H. 1999); McKenna v. Harrison Mem’l Hosp., 960 P.2d 486 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1998); Weissman v. Dow Corning Corp., 892 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); St. Mary 
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Casko, 639 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Cobb v. Dallas Fort Worth Med. 
Ctr.-Grand Prairie, 48 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 2001); Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc. 558 
A.2d 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Hoff v. Zimmer, 746 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (hip 
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A few courts, cognizant of the dichotomy, nevertheless have applied strict 
products liability in cases where a product, such as a surgical gown, is clearly 
incidental to any professional services.125  Overall, however, far too much 
seems to be made of this distinction. Indeed, at least one court otherwise 
hostile to the imposition of strict liability on health care providers has 
dismissed the service-product distinction as a legal fiction noting: 
To be sure, the chief function of hospitals is to provide a service.  But when a 
product is provided as part of the service, and the service provider bills 
separately for the product, the rule that has emerged outside of the hospital 
context is that the provision of the product is a distribution for purposes of 
strict products liability.  To depart from this characterization of such a 
transaction for the special case of hospitals would, in our view, generate 
unnecessary confusion.  If there are sound policy reasons for not imposing 
strict products liability on hospitals, those policy reasons should be addressed 
directly, not obscured by artificial semantic distinctions.126 
Other theories antithetical to the application of products liability to health 
care delivery scenarios seem to be on no stronger ground.  For example, some 
courts have viewed the supply of the product as merely incidental to the 
provision of the professional services.127  Others have characterized the health 
care provider as the actual consumer of the product.128  Perhaps the most 
interesting recent development and, from the plaintiff’s perspective, ominous 
development has been a series of cases that reject strict products liability on the 
explicit basis that the defendant was a health care provider.129 
If the imposition of strict liability on health care providers that work with 
or implant products has not been well received, some upstream liability 
remains, shifting costs from patients to drug and device makers.  But here, too, 
judicial conservatism in compensating patient-consumers is evident.  
 
prosthesis); Goldfarb v. Teitelbaum, 540 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (mandibular 
prosthesis); Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(pacemaker); Probst v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 440 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (metal 
spinal rod); Vergott v. Deseret Pharm. Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972) (intracath needle); San 
Diego Hosp. Assn. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Pierson v. Sharp 
Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 125. See, e.g., Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Porter v. 
Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Karibjanian v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. 
Hosp. 717 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
 126. Parker v. St. Vincent Hosp., 919 P.2d 1104, 1107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (citations 
omitted). 
 127. See Easterly v. HSP of Tex., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
 128. See N. Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Goldberg, 520 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); 
Cafazzo, 635 A.2d 151 at 154-55. 
 129. See Rogers v. Synthes, Ltd., 626 So. 2d 775, 777 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Budding v. SSM 
Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Mo. 2000); Tanuz v. Carlberg, 921 P.2d 309, 312 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1996); Parker, 919 P.2d at 1110. 
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Jurisdictions that have shifted pharmaceutical drug cases out of strict liability 
and back into negligence130 likely will do the same with medical devices.131  
Equally, the learned intermediary doctrine, wounded though it is,132 will block 
some strict liability failure to warn cases.133  Manufacturing or design defect 
cases are not susceptible to the learned intermediary rule, but likely will face 
preemption issues in many implant cases.134 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In a February 2001 report, the President’s Information Technology 
Advisory Committee (PITAC) commented: 
New information technologies have the potential to dramatically improve our 
health care system as it exists today.  Information technology can help ensure 
that health-related information and services are available anytime and 
anywhere, permit health care practitioners to access patient information 
wherever it may be located, and help researchers better understand the human 
body, share information, and ultimately develop more beneficial treatments to 
keep Americans healthy.135 
Yet, as discussed in this Article, our courts will experience some difficult 
questions as technologically-mediated quality control proliferates.  While it 
seems arguable that the health care industry must not face too many 
disincentives as it explores the role of technology in reducing medical error, 
there seems to be scant justification for continuing to allow the health care 
industry to externalize more costs than other industries.  The tort system has 
been a willing conspirator in this process, preferring an individual professional 
liability model to a more realistic institutional one, thus insulating health care 
providers from the true costs associated with using and distributing products.  
It would be a mistake to recognize the imperative of reducing medical error 
and the attendant institutional responsibility, only to permit health care entities 
 
 130. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000). 
 131. See Artiglio v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (breast 
implant). 
 132. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 133. See, e.g., Miller v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 831 (D. Md. 2000); Dyer 
v. Danek Med., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 732 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 
28 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. App. 2000); Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310 
(N.D. Okla. 2000); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Litig., 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
 134. See, e.g., Richardson v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. 
La. 1994); Dunlap v. Medtronic, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 888 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
 135. President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee, Panel on Transforming 
Health Care, Report to the President on Transforming Health Care Through Information 
Technology 17 (Feb.  2001), available at http://www.itrd.gov/pubs/pitac/pitac-hc-9feb01.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2001); see also CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 9, at 175-76. (“IT 
has enormous potential to improve the quality of health care.”). 
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to shift costs associated with ameliorating technologies to the very patients 
who were threatened by the original errors. 
The realities of technologically-mediated health care delivery expose the 
arguments and fictions that have underpinned the generosity shown to the 
health care industry by the courts.  The fundamental error of those clustered 
around “the machine that goes ‘ping’” was that they almost forgot about the 
patient.136  Applying institutional liability and mainstream products liability 
principles to technologically-mediated care would be a sign that the tort system 
will not make the same mistake. 
 
 136. The Miracle of Birth, in MONTY PYTHON’S THE MEANING OF LIFE (1983), script 
available at http://www.montypython.net/meaningmm.php3#Miracle%20of%20Birth (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2001). 
  OBSTETRICIAN: Eehhh. Still something missing, though. 
  DOCTOR SPENSER: Hm? 
  OBSTETRICIAN: Hmmm. Mmmmm. [snap] 
  OBSTETRICIAN and DOCTOR SPENSER: Patient! 
  OBSTETRICIAN: Yes. 
Id. 
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